Introduction

The Immigration and Asylum Bill (given its Second Reading in the House of Commons on 13 July 2026 and at the Committee stage at the time of writing in September 2026) proposes in Part 1 to establish an ‘Independent Immigration Appeals Authority’ (IIAA) to decide appeals on matters such as protection claims (e.g., in relation to refugee status), human rights (e.g., family life matters), Withdrawal Agreement EU Citizens’ Rights cases, and deprivation of British citizenship (clause 1). This new body will replace the function of the First-tier Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) (FTT). In this post, I consider its key features and why there is a need for immigration appeals to continue to be decided by legally qualified persons.

Key features of the proposed ‘Independent Immigration Appeals Authority’

The seven key features of this proposed body are as follows. First, appeals are to be decided by ‘executive adjudicators’ who need hold no legal qualification at all, see clause 2 and Schedule 2. While alongside ‘executive adjudicators’ the Bill provides for the appointment of ‘senior adjudicators’ with some prior legal experience, even this limited concession to professional competence requires only 2 years in practice, or experience of ‘law-related activities’ (undefined) that makes an applicant suitable for appointment in the opinion of the Chief Executive. Further, it is clear that the Home Office intend that most immigration appeals will be decided by non-legally qualified ‘executive adjudicators’. Contrast the position at present where FTT judges are required to have held a legal qualification for 5 years, see section 4 of and Schedule 2 to the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007.

Second, the Bill provides for the appointment of those adjudicators by the Chief Executive of the IIAA (the first Chief Executive being appointed by the Home Secretary, the latter being one party in all immigration appeals (Clause 2(3) and (5)) instead of by the independent Senior President of Tribunals (originally, the Lord Chancellor) as is the case with FTT judges (see section 4 of and Schedule 2 to the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007).

Third, the proposals include a stated objective that does not simply seek to deal with cases ‘fairly and justly’, as the FTT must do at present under its procedural rules (Rule 2 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Rules 2014) but rather which, among other things, seeks to integrate the adjudicative process into the executive/Home Office ‘immigration and asylum system’. In exercising its functions, the IIAA must, among other things, ‘have regard to the public interest, and in particular to the fact that the IIAA operates as a key part of the immigration and asylum system’ (clause 1(5)).

Fourth, the Bill also provides for the ouster of the supervision of the High Court by way of judicial review of IIAA functions and decisions (clause 1(8)), something alone that demands detailed consideration. Fifth, it provides for rules of procedure to be made not by the independent Tribunal Procedure Committee, as is the case with the FTT (see section 22 of and Schedule 5 to the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007) but by an IAA controlled board (clause 4 and clause 5).

Sixth, the power to seek an expedited appeal timetable is to rest solely with the Home Secretary, who is one party in every appeal (clause 9). Seventh and finally, non-legally qualified adjudicators to be given the power to seek to charge (fine) an appellant’s representative (who may be a barrister) on the basis of so-called improper conduct (clause 10).

Taken as a package, these proposals move immigration appeals away from being solely part of the independent judicial branch of government and bring them, at least in part if not mainly, within the domain of the executive (the Home Office). This is a retrograde step and has implications for the quality of the rule of law.

Immigration appeals should continue to be decided by legally qualified persons

It is in the interests of justice that the persons who decide immigration appeals are legal qualified, as FTT judges are at present. When an immigration appeals system was first set up under the Immigration Appeals Act 1969 and modified thereafter by the Immigration Act 1971, there was no requirement for ‘adjudicators’ (as they were then called as well) to be legally qualified. However, in the operation of the appeals system under the Immigration Act 1971, the quality of adjudicators and their decisions were criticised by service users and others, see for example, the Annual Report of the Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants (JCWI) 1975-1976, and the UKIAS Report for 1977-78, both cited in Immigration Law and Practice (2nd edition, 1987), Ian A. Macdonald, pp. 418-419.

The problem occasioned by the lack of legal qualifications for office was rectified finally by the then Labour Government’s Immigration and Asylum Act 1999, which imposed a requirement for adjudicators to hold a legal qualification for 7 years or hold equivalent legal and other experience (section 57(3) of and Schedule 3 to the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999). In practice, all new appointees were legally qualified thereafter. At present, as noted above, FTT judges are required to have held a legal qualification for 5 years (section 4 of and Schedule 2 to the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007), noting that while provision is also made for persons to be appointed who are not legally qualified but who have ‘gained experience in law’ that makes them suitable for appointment, in practice, FTT judges sitting in its immigration and asylum chamber satisfy the judicial appointment eligibility condition on a 5-years’ legally qualified basis.

The proposal to remove the requirement for persons deciding appeals to be legally qualified lacks any convincing justification. Appeals ought to be decided by legally qualified persons. The judicial branch of government in its various iterations in courts and tribunals makes use of qualified lawyers to decide cases. That ensures high quality and legally sound dispute resolution. There is no good reason to depart from that longstanding approach.

The prescribed elements of legal education and training required for legal qualification are there for a reason. Among other things, the academic stage provides the necessary education in a full range of areas of law that concern immigration, such as administrative law (including the English legal system), common law principles (such as fairness), the interpretation and application of statute law, criminal law, and so on. Thereafter, the vocational stage (for example, ‘Bar School’ for barristers) builds on that foundation, with training on matters such as the law of evidence, civil procedure, and legal writing (for example, written opinions and written advice, both being techniques of legal writing the practise of which lays the foundations for being able to write good judgments). The final stage of preparation for legal practice is being a trainee for a year (such as being a pupil barrister in a set of chambers). This provides the necessary real-world experience of practice of the law to enable a person to be able to exercise all the responsibilities of a professional lawyer in practice who is to have care for the lives of their clients and their interests. Thereafter, the 5-years’ legal practice requirement in order to be an FTT judge ensures that immigration judges have the experience of the practice of law and of arguing cases to be able to move to the next stage of responsibility in judicially deciding cases of vital importance to people’s lives.

It is fanciful to suggest that that legally-unqualified persons can go on a lesser course of training to become immigration adjudicators and ensure that law and justice are dispensed to the necessary standard in deciding cases, such that legally qualified lawyer judges may be dispensed with safely. Deciding immigration law cases involves many things, including application of knowledge and understanding of international treaties (including the UK’s 2020 EU Withdrawal Agreement, the 1951 United Nations Refugee Convention, and the 1950 European Human Rights Convention (EHCR)/Human Rights Act 1998), the domestic structure of immigration control and immigration laws, British nationality law, administrative law, common law principles, how to approach evidence including that of non-English speakers, how to assess cross-examination, how to assess credibility, how to weigh questions of fact, and how to interpret and apply the law.

No matter how well-intentioned, a non-legally qualified adjudicator will struggle to master these things. Legal qualifications and experience are there for a reason: not to assert status but to provide the necessary skills to do the job. A non-legally qualified adjudicator may produce something called a judgment but it risks being at least to some degree a simulacrum or hallucination of the real thing, with all the risk for sound judicial determination that implies. In the result, on account of a material error of law by an executive adjudicator, a British citizen may wrongly be deprived of British citizenship, a refugee may be returned to a place where they risk persecution or torture, a British family with a foreign national member may be broken up, or an EU citizen may be denied her Withdrawal Agreement rights.

Further, it is a matter of concern that non-legally qualified adjudicators are to be given the power to charge (fine) an appellant’s legally qualified representative (who may be a barrister) on the basis of so-called improper conduct (clause 10. Note it is the IIAA that is to have that power but the context will be proceedings before an adjudicator and their report of the same). A barrister must be able to advance their client’s case with vigour, mindful always of the respect due to a court or tribunal and of its procedural requirements. Where a non-legally qualified executive adjudicator fails to grasp the fundamental basis on any applicable law or legal principle, vigorous exchanges may result between them and a legally qualified advocate. To give a non-legally qualified adjudicator the power to charge (fine) an appellant’s legally qualified representative (or to recommend that the IIAA does so) on the basis of so-called improper conduct before them hands them a penal sanction power that they do not need and which may have a chilling effect on the ability of a legal representative to make a case fearlessly on behalf of their client. There is already a sufficient safeguard. For example, barristers must comply with the Bar Standard’s Board Handbook and Code of Conduct . Any alleged improper conduct is capable of leading to an advocate being referred at discretion to the appropriate regulator, if referral is indeed really merited, in the usual way.

It is no answer to these objections to opine that there are other examples of complex and weighty decisions being made by legally unqualified persons. Each context is different. In any event, in judging summary criminal proceedings, lay magistrates are supported in the court room during the hearing by legally qualified justices’ clerks, while in the field of planning law, planning inspectors need to be full or chartered members of a professional body such as the Royal Institute of Chartered Surveyors. In immigration appeals, complex questions of fact and law, that involve international treaty commitments, fall to be decided. Legally qualified judges are necessary.

Further, the proposed onward right of appeal from adjudicators to the Upper Tribunal (clause 7) is no guarantee that adjudicator errors will be corrected. First, it is wrong in principle to plan for an increase in legal error in first-instance decision-making. Second, there is no guarantee that a materially flawed adjudicator decision will be made the subject of onward appeal (a poorly advised or unrepresented person may not pursue one), that permission to appeal will be granted, or that any error will be corrected on appeal.

If at present the FTT lacks the capacity to handle the number of appeals or the flexibility to cope with any surge in demand, it is right to fix that problem rather than to dismantle it. Were the County Court, which decides civil claims, to face similar issues, a solution would no doubt be found that did not involve its abolition. It is better to fix what exists that to engage in structural revolution.

Conclusion

The proposed adjudicators ought to be required to hold the same minimum legal qualification as FTT judges. To have adjudicators with no legal qualification deciding appeals increases the risk of material legal error in the decisions made, with attendant practical and cost implications occasioned by the need to rectify or otherwise overcome them.